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A terminal showing go test and go vet passing while gohawk reports four warnings: lockorder, resourcelifetime, goroutineownership, and concurrentcapture

Green Build, Leaking Service: Static Analysis for Go Concurrency and Resource Bugs with gohawk

A Go service can pass every test, clear go vet without a word, and still be quietly broken. The kind of bug I mean does not throw an exception or fail an assertion. It leaks. A file handle that never gets closed, a goroutine that nobody waits for, a lock that an early return skips over. Each one is invisible on a laptop with a single request in flight, and each one turns into a 3 a.m. incident once real traffic arrives: file descriptors exhausted, memory climbing with abandoned goroutines, a handler wedged on a lock that was never released. ...

November 6, 2026 · 21 min · Scott Algatt
Two cards compared side by side. A low-quality SBOM shows 10 vulnerabilities seen, 2 components unchecked, and conformance FAIL with 3 mandatory failures. A BomLens-generated SBOM shows 36 vulnerabilities seen, 0 unchecked, conformance PASS. Below, three critical findings with a 7-day deadline: ejs CVE-2022-29078, lodash CVE-2019-10744, minimist CVE-2021-44906.

Your Supplier Sent an SBOM. Now What?: Turning CycloneDX Into Risk Decisions with BomLens

Here is a situation that has quietly become everyone’s problem. A vendor ships you a piece of software, and along with it a file called bom.json. It is a Software Bill of Materials, or SBOM: a machine-readable list of every open-source component inside that software, the same way a packaged food lists its ingredients. Regulators now ask for these, procurement teams now demand them, and your own security team now receives them. So the file lands in your inbox. Now what? ...

November 3, 2026 · 20 min · Scott Algatt
Two terminal panes side by side: a Go program using ygo prints a 96-byte update with sha256 7950d34c2dc30055, and a Node.js script using yjs 13.6.33 prints the same length and hash with identical_to_go=true

Same Bytes, Different Language: Testing ygo's Claim of Byte-for-Byte Yjs Compatibility

Every real-time collaborative editor has the same hard problem underneath it. Two people type into the same paragraph at the same moment, possibly while one of them is offline on a train, and when everything reconnects both screens have to end up showing exactly the same text without anyone’s edit vanishing. The family of data structures built to solve that is called a CRDT (Conflict-free Replicated Data Type): a structure designed so that copies of a document (called replicas) can accept edits independently and always merge to the same result, in any order, with no central referee deciding who wins. ...

October 16, 2026 · 19 min · Scott Algatt
Terminal output from a NEEDLE lab run: a fake agent exits 0 on a bead it lied about, NEEDLE re-runs the definition of done, the verification fails, a false close is detected, and a priority-0 Fix build bead is filed automatically

Boring on Purpose: Wrapping Coding Agents in NEEDLE's State Machine

The Rabbit Hole Generator gave me NEEDLE this week, and it lands right on a question I keep running into: once you let a coding agent run unattended, who decides whether it actually did the job? Most of the excitement around coding agents is about making them smarter. NEEDLE is interested in something much less glamorous. It assumes the agent is unpredictable, wraps it in a loop where every step around the agent is fixed and logged, and then refuses to take the agent’s word that it finished. I didn’t want to point a real AI model with its permission prompts switched off at anything, so I ran the whole thing against a fake agent: a 20-line shell script that succeeds, fails, hangs, and lies on cue. The lying one turned out to be the most interesting part. ...

October 9, 2026 · 35 min · Scott Algatt
Two oci-explorer score cards stacked. The top one is a busybox image with four 20-byte junk files attached and scores 9 out of 10, grade A. The bottom one is oci-explorer's own image, keylessly signed in CI and verified with cosign, and also scores 9 out of 10, grade A.

Grade A, Signed by Nobody: What oci-explorer's Supply Chain Score Actually Measures

Ask most teams what’s attached to the container image running in production and you’ll get an answer about their CI pipeline: “we sign it, we generate an SBOM, we attach provenance.” That’s a statement about what the pipeline tried to do. Whether the registry actually holds those things, linked to the right image, in a form the next tool can find, is a different question, and it’s surprisingly hard to answer in under a minute. ...

October 2, 2026 · 21 min · Scott Algatt